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China has officially restricted exports of rare earth for several years and announced this year it will 
further  tighten  exports.  Rare  earth  is  a  group  of  17  different  metals,  usually  found  clustered 
together. These metals have hundreds of different industry applications. For example, they are used 
in certain high capacity magnets, batteries and lasers. As the rare earth elements are used in 
sectors that are assumed to have an over-proportionate growth potential (eg. green-technology), 
policy makers are paying particular attention to them. In the policy debate, the different elements 
are considered jointly, as they are typically clustered together. But each element has its own supply 
and demand characteristics. Consequently, prices for the individual elements might differ by factor 
20 (in mid 2010, Samarium was quoted at $32 per kilogram while Terbium was quoted at $600). 
As  China  is  currently  the  predominant  producer  of  rare  earth  (>95%  of  total  production),  the 
reduction  of  Chinese  rare  earth  exports  will  have  effects  on  global  supplies.  Thus,  rare  earth 
elements have been very actively covered in the media and various G20 policy makers (secretary of 
state Clinton, chancellor Merkel, etc.) have expressed their concern. Business interest groups want 
to put rare earth on the official G20 agenda – regardless, the issue will be unofficially discussed in 
Seoul. But should policy makers really care?  
This depends on what China wants to achieve  by restricting rare earth exports. Chinese export 
restrictions for rare earth could be interpreted in five different ways:  
(1) China wants to save rare earth resources for future generations. As rare earth elements are 
abundant in both China and the rest of the world, this is a rather unlikely explanation. But even if 
easily produced sources are rare, a slow exploration for fear of overexploitation should not merit 
political concern, as the Chinese interest of a stable, long-term supply would be aligned with the 
global interest. 
(2) China uses rare earth to exercise political influence. The current case-in-point is a supposed 
freeze in exports to Japan, allegedly due to political disputes. In Foreign Policy, Tim Worstall argues 
convincingly that rare earth elements are an unlikely tool for exercising political pressure as they 
cannot be effectively monopolised by China. The reason is, that rare earth can be produced in many 
different countries (China only holds about one third of the known resources), admittedly at higher 
cost.  
(3) China is trying to reduce the ecological impact of rare earth production. The production of rare 
earth in China is very environmental unfriendly and hazardous for the corresponding workforce. 
Consequently, Chinese export reductions might be a move to reduce the price paid by workers and 
the  environment  for  growth  going  elsewhere.  In  this  context,  export  reductions  might  be  an 
important tool to gain control of production in illegal mines. Even though paying higher prices for rare 
earth would not be appreciated by the Western industrial consumer, correctly pricing pollution and 
labour are well-accepted principles in Western countries.  
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(4) China tries to maximize the profits from exporting rare earth. As in the short-run Chinese rare 
earth could only be replaced by producers with significantly higher costs, China is currently able to 
increase its profits by restricting exports of rare earth as the decreased export volumes are offset by 
the increased prices. Numbers quoted in the press, arguing that in 2010 a 30% decrease in exports 
occurred while prices increased threefold, would be consistent with a profit maximisation strategy. 
Extracting monopoly rents on natural resources is common around the globe. Most oil producers for 
example  employ  duties  on  oil  exports  to  ensure  that  the  fuel  is  exported  at  prices  above  the 
production cost. Such a profit maximisation is constrained by the entry of new suppliers. If China 
raised the price above a certain level, profit seeking mining companies would start producing non-
Chinese rare earth resources (eg. in the US or Australia). Consequently, either China keeps the price 
slightly below the entry threshold or a limited number of producers would secure stable supplies of 
rare earth at prices supposedly somewhat above the production cost of the most expensive supplier.  
(5) China is using export restrictions for domestic industrial policy reasons. Restricting exports lead 
to a de facto double pricing. Domestic prices of rare earth would drop, while foreign prices would rise. 
This would give domestic high-tech producers a cost advantage over their foreign competitors. This 
last point has been the most discussed in recent months, as it seems to be in line with China’s 
mercantilist economic policy. This raises the question: Could such a strategy be successful? And 
would this harm Western economic interest? Subsidizing Chinese high-tech companies’ by double-
pricing rare earth could of course be effective in increasing these companies’ world market share or 
profit in the short run. This does not mean, however, that such an intervention is efficient. 
First, higher world market prices will make other rare earth sources available. Consequently, the 
current cost spread between China, which is producing on a large scale, and the rest of the world that 
currently is not, will not persist. High prices will thereby not only drive the exploitation of new non-
Chinese resources, but also encourage the development of new technologies for exploring, producing 
and processing rare earth (the separation of the different rare earth elements is one of the most 
costly  parts  of  the  production  process).  Consequently,  market  forces  are  likely  to  drive  down 
Western production costs in the mid-term.  
Second, due to the export restriction, the demand for Chinese rare earth would be artificially low. This 
would lead to the intended lower price for rare earth. Chinese investors would make their decisions 
with respect to the internal price, as Chinese companies would need two commodities for exporting: 
the rare earth valued at the domestic price and the export rights valued at the price differential 
between internal and external market. Therefore, it should play no role, whether the export rights are 
allocated for free to some companies or auctioned off. The low Chinese rare earth price, however, 
would distort the incentives to invest in new resources and technologies in China.  
Third, in many applications, rare earth elements might be replaced. If, for example, the cost of 
certain rare earth magnets became too high, companies might decide to use lesser quality magnets. 
Thus, wind turbines will continue to be built in Western countries, even though replacing the rare 
earth magnets might imply some efficiency losses. This is reflected by the rather small share of the 
rare earth cost in the value of most total products. The total market value of separated rare earth is  
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several billion dollars (USD), while the value of iron ore is a few dozen billions and crude oil several 
trillion. Thus, the price of rare earth is unlikely to be a key driver for the location of most downstream 
value chains.  
Fourth, a subsidisation of rare earth would be intended to allow lower prices at the next stage of the 
value chain (eg. rare earth magnets). To achieve the industry policy goal, it would be necessary, 
however, to also ensure that these intermediate products (magnets) are not exported in order to 
allow cheaper products at the subsequent stage (eg. generators) and so forth. Thus, an entire sector 
would be created on incorrect relative prices. In other words, it is more profitable to use a cheap 
machine  that  wastes  some  of  the  rare  earth  than  to  install  a  more  expensive  machine.  The 
corresponding overuse of rare earth and rare earth products would make the entire value chain 
uncompetitive as soon as rare earth cost inside and outside China converge.  
Double pricing will lead to opposing effects in China and the West. In China, the underinvestment in 
mining and the wasteful use of rare earth will increase demand and decrease supply. In the West, 
the overinvestment in supply and the substitution of rare earth in some areas will decrease demand 
and increase supply. Consequently, markets alone will force rare earth prices in the West and China 
to converge. [Furthermore, double pricing is difficult to sustain as it implies internal redistribution. 
When double pricing is effective, the right to export becomes very valuable. In this case, the worse-
off  companies  would  oppose  the  scheme  and  might  find  ways  to  circumvent  it.]  Therefore, 
restricting the export of rare earth is unlikely to prove an efficient tool for attracting highly-skilled 
and capital-intensive, high-tech industries.  
So what do Western companies have to fear? Companies in all sectors know that depending on only 
one supplier of a crucial input can be very painful. Thus, companies can chose between vertical 
integration, contracts that reduce the risk of hold-up or diversification. The first two options are not 
very  viable,  as  Western  companies  are  unlikely  to  either  strike  renegotiation-proof  deals  with 
Chinese  companies  or  even  integrate  Chinese  suppliers.  Thus,  diversifying  supplies  by  either 
contracting some volumes with alternative suppliers, building up stocks, financially hedging against 
increasing  prices  or  even  buying  into  rare  earth  production  projects  should  be  the  answer  for 
industrial users of rare earth. The optimal degree of diversification can only be delivered by the 
market. The reason is that the willingness to pay for diversification largely depends on private 
information  about  the  individual  companies’  cost  of  decreasing  rare  earth  consumption. 
Furthermore,  the  large  number  of  consumers  from  different  countries  should  assure  the 
development of a sufficiently liquid market for rare earth. Thus, the market will provide a close-to- 
optimal level of production capacity and stocks. [As for most natural resource markets, there will be 
some concentration on the supply side due to the high optimal size of the mines leading to prices 
above  production  cost.]  Therefore,  government  support  to  rare  earth  consumer,  administrative 
stocks to smooth market prices or government support to increase non-Chinese production would 
make things worse by punishing companies that invested in risk mitigation.  
As double pricing will be an inefficient industrial policy and markets will deliver sufficient rare earth 
supplies outside China, Western governments should restrain from protectionist countermeasures  
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or unjustified counteroffers. That being said, trading the opening of the Chinese rare earth sector 
against the opening of another G20 or WTO market (eg. agriculture) would be a win-win situation. 
 
 